Passions for Justice: Fragmentation and Union in Tragedy, Farce, Comedy, and Tragi-Comedy by Larner, Daniel
Western Washington University
Western CEDAR
Fairhaven Faculty Publications Fairhaven College of Interdisciplinary Studies
Spring 2001
Passions for Justice: Fragmentation and Union in
Tragedy, Farce, Comedy, and Tragi-Comedy
Daniel Larner
Fairhaven College, Western Washington University, dan.larner@wwu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/fairhaven_facpubs
Part of the Theatre and Performance Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fairhaven College of Interdisciplinary Studies at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Fairhaven Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact
westerncedar@wwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Larner, Daniel, "Passions for Justice: Fragmentation and Union in Tragedy, Farce, Comedy, and Tragi-Comedy" (2001). Fairhaven
Faculty Publications. 7.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/fairhaven_facpubs/7
  Cardozo School of Law and Taylor & Francis, Ltd. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature.
http://www.jstor.org
Cardozo School of Law
Passions for Justice: Fragmentation and Union in Tragedy, Farce, Comedy, and Tragi-Comedy 
Author(s): Daniel Larner 
Source:   Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-118
Published by:  on behalf of  Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Cardozo School of Law
Stable URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/lal.1.2001.13.1.107
Accessed: 10-08-2015 21:05 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
 info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content 
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. 
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:05:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Passions for Jutice: 
Fragmentation and Union in Tragedy, 
Farce, Comedy, and Tragi-Comedy 
Daniel Larner 
This article examines the tragi-comic mode and some strong contem- 
porary examples of the form, probing in detail the tragi-comic fabric 
through a look at farce, and searching for those ironic contours which 
shape our ideas of justice.' The most powerll of these ironic contexts 
emerges as we see that our reforming ideas of justice are at one and the 
same time crucial, deep-rooted, hndamental, and almost ineluctable on 
the one hand, and fragmented, perspective-dependent, and hypercontex- 
tual on the other. The fundamental dimensions come out in tragic, comic, 
and farsic forms. The contextual elements are embedded in the content 
that fills out, and in ironic ways transforms, these ancient structures. 
In order to make clear the emergence of such complex and powerful 
ironies, and the tragi-comic form which lets us see them, we must begin 
with a review of the workings of the dramatic metaphor. 
I. The Metaphor 
Metaphor and drama share an essence: transformation. A metaphor 
carries one world of meaning to another, enlarging what it comes to by 
what it brings along with it. What is at stake is a meaning, which is trans- 
formed to something quite beyond its original state. 
Drama is, in its deepest workings, metaphorical. That is, drama takes 
an action done by characters and transforms it from the mundane to the 
expectant, the meaningful, carrying it from the realm of its factuality to 
wider worlds. Seen this way, drama transforms all action to the act of under- 
standing,2 of putting some sort of prop under mere fact, of supplying - by 
some combination of rational, imagistic, associative, and poetic means - 
context, explanation, cause, meaning, analogy, connection, relation. 
The fact of death, transported by metaphor in one ancient vision of 
the world, is seen not just as the opposite and terminus of life, but also as 
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order turned to disorder, ambition to destruction, strength and wisdom 
to weakness and foolishness. And this in turn is transported into (that is, 
becomes a metaphor for) a world where sudden intrusions of fate - buf- 
feting our wills and testing our wisdom - become the barometers of 
wisdom. This is the world of tragedy, in which our most luminous visions 
of right and justice and our most courageous efforts to understand, to 
preserve, and to improve may be reversed into chaos, destruction, and 
death. The irony could not be more profound or more total. A world 
where this can happen is one in which our fates are an agonizing mystery; 
death is imminent; violence is capricious, maiming, and deadly; striving 
can be dangerous; pain is permanent; and knowledge, particularly knowl- 
edge of justice, is realized and recognized only by watching it shatter at its 
extreme limits. 
Similarly, imagine a domestic world, concerned only with patching 
up its problems and moving on with life. Surviving - getting the best of 
the person next to you in a competition for food, money, or a mate - is 
transported to (becomes a metaphor for) getting ahead in society, 
wanting to learn from mistakes, to overcome problems, and to promote 
harmony in the widest possible circle. This, in turn, is transported into 
(becomes a metaphor for) a world where these are the sole concerns - 
where peace reigns and lives continually improve, uninterrupted and 
unaffected by the sober uncertainties and the heavy burdens of the tragic 
universe. This is the world of comedy, a world in which the practical jus- 
tice of compromise and settlement is the expected norm and the happy, 
sensible outcome. 
The action of comedy is a moving together, a healing, a joining of the 
once separated couple who are to create the new generation and to con- 
tinue the flow of life. The ironies of this world are those of ignorances, 
stupidities, foibles exposed, dignities deflated, imperfections accepted. 
The defective and the guilty are not dangerous or deadly, but merely 
ridiculous. They can recover and learn, and re-integrate into the commu- 
nity. This world is protected from violence and tragedy. Its walls appear 
to be impermeable. If violence occurs, it is not serious (a slap, a punch, a 
fall), and the wounds heal. Even bruised egos heal, and the characters 
learn what they need to learn to change their ways and to get along. 
If the comic vision is the building or the repair of justice in a com- 
munity, affirming domestic custom and the wisdom of social virtue, the 
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tragic vision affirms only that we can dare to do justice, strive to under- 
stand, struggle to choose wisely. This latter vision is achieved, ironically, 
in an extreme encounter with limits. We learn how large our conviction 
of justice can be, how heroic our deeds, human understanding, ambition, 
and striving can be by watching those much larger than ourselves exceed 
their limits and get crushed. 
II. The Comic Mirror 
Within this tragic vision, there is an implied comic mirror, lurking on 
the other side of the deepest ironies. This comes out most eloquently in 
farce. Farce approaches tragic vision by being the opposite of realism, 
eschewing the mere factuality of things and the flat ironies that accompa- 
ny them. In realism, things are what they are, and only what they are. 
Whatever implication or meaning we may assign to them has a tendency 
to collapse, to be patently ironical (it is what it is, but nothing more) in a 
world of mere fa~tness.~ 
In farce, however, fact functions in a world wildly distorted, working 
by a logic which may be clear, but which is wacky and sometimes even 
impossible. When the coyote misses the roadrunner and falls off a 5,000 
foot cliff, we laugh, and he somehow lives to chase again. When Laurel 
and Hardy's determined politeness and civil good manners turn sudden- 
ly to infantile rage, causing them to wreak methodical destruction, piece 
by piece, on whatever object attaches to the person they are angry at 
(automobile,* grocery shop,5 or house'), the destruction is funny. In 
defense of their dignity and respectability, they tear apart something valu- 
able which belongs to whoever impugns that dignity, like a child tearing 
apart another child's teddy bear. And the offending party retaliates, creat- 
ing new destruction and new humiliation. With each round of the battle, 
the destruction and the fun escalate. 
Looked at literally, this is pathological - a totally Hobbesian, 
anarchic world in which ideas of justice have been reduced to the simplest 
knee-jerk ethic of revenge. In an ordinary world, Laurel and Hardy, and 
whoever they are fighting with, would be committing felonies. Looked at 
metaphorically, the violence is transported to a world in which the threat 
of violence and destruction is displaced into something far less dangerous 
and more familiar. It is like our primal response as babies to the game of 
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peek-a-boo. In the first instant, the emergence of a face from a hidden 
place is frightening. But an instant later, it is recognized - that’s Mommy 
or  Daddy or Uncle Harry! - and the fear is replaced by recognition and 
vented by laughter. The whole process is so much fun that, as we all know, 
if the child is young enough it can be repeated almost endlessly. Thus in 
larce, the metaphor allows us to recognize that this is, after all, only dig- 
nity and property that are being destroyed, not lives and civilizations. 
While the world is being torn apart in small, it is being affirmed in large. 
We can feel that momentary twinge of horror - he’s tearing the walls of 
that house down! -then laugh and indulge ourselves in the infantile fan- 
tasy without ruining the larger world of meaning we think we see and 
persistently count on being there. And in fact, the ritual of farce is in part 
,I ritual invocation of that larger world, an implicated order of justice and 
civil society, held in abeyance, banned for the evening by agreement, vital 
by virtue of its absence. It may be possible to claim that the farce is the 
(acrifice to the tragedy, as if by performing the farce, by admitting this 
level of fabulous destruction and disorder, we stave off the necessity of the 
tragedy. It is as if justice grows through our ritual ability to hold tragedy 
<it this metaphorical arm’s length. We come together in the recognition of 
the larger, more frightening world through the much smaller domestic 
world of houses, cars, slapsticks, and rolling pins. 
Let me offer two illustrations of violent comedy in this mode of ritu- 
‘11 farce. The first is from one of Laurel and Hardy’s films, Titfor Tat,’ in 
which our two heroes are just setting up a new electrical appliance shop 
and run into trouble with the grocer next door. In a hilarious scene in 
which Ollie falls off a ladder into a second-story bedroom window, the 
grocer thinks, erroneously, that Ollie has made advances on his wife. He 
marches into their store, insults them and breaks something. “Take that.” 
’rhen, summoning his dignity, he leaves. Laurel and Hardy go to his shop 
m d  retaliate, in turn, by breaking something there. Then the war esca- 
iates, with the grocer destroying more and more valuable items in the 
electrical shop and Laurel and Hardy doing the same in the grocery, final- 
ly pushing the grocer into a huge basket of eggs and dumping another 
1)asketful over his head. 
But the kicker is that every time Laurel and Hardy decide to retaliate 
for  the grocer‘s latest raid and leave their shop to invade his, an anony- 
mous man in a double-breasted suit and fedora enters their shop and 
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steals something from it. Each time, when Laurel and Hardy return to 
their own shop, they encounter him leaving, appliances in hand. 
Unfailingly, he greets them politely,. and they, always the perfect gentle- 
men, unfailingly return the greeting, never taking notice of the fact that, 
right in front of them, he is carrying merchandise out of their store. 
Finally, the man returns with a large truck and completely empties the 
store! While the form of this sequence is the old reliable running gag, the 
metaphorical effect is horrifying. It is as if the universe had it in for our 
heroes. Just when they are down and under attack, everything is taken 
from them. This universe is like Lear’s, arbitrarily cruel, cruelly imper- 
sonal, void of any hint of justice. But why is this hnny  rather than 
devastating? I suspect it is for the same reason that in cartoons, when a 
character is ironed flat by a steam roller, he always re-inflates to chase 
again. In this farcical world, no loss is permanent. Healing is magical, and 
our dignified gents will be back again soon to do battle with the next 
assault on their pretentious dignities. This strange anarchy is frightening, 
but only in the same way peek-a-boo is frightening. For a moment, deep 
down, it might look like tragedy, but we quickly recognize our old friend, 
farce. The sacrifice is offered, made, and accepted. 
In the second illustration, the violence is not literal, but implied. In 
The Great Dictator, Charlie Chaplin plays both Hynkel, the ranting 
Hitler parody, and the tramp - this time a Jewish barber - who, when 
he gets his chance to speak about fighting for democracy, starts modestly, 
but gets swept away by his enthusiasm and also ends up in a rant. As 
Michael Wood points out, “Ranting is ranting ... An idea going in one 
direction meets another idea, and Chaplin plays both ideas, [making] the 
meeting ground ... his [own] face.”* 
We laugh, but it hurts to recognize how close we all are to ranting like 
that. Then it hurts to remember who Hynkel really stands for, and the 
torture and genocide of the Nazi era, just as it hurts to think about the 
feelings of the poor sap who had that basket of eggs dumped on him, or 
his house torn down, board by board - but we’re still laughing.’ 
Laughing at destruction is the sacrifice to the god of Fear. Wood observes 
that “Chaplin’s movies, and indeed his life, remind us of all the tramps 
and others who don’t make it to Easy Street, who get to dress up only as 
themselves, and whose roles do become destinies, because the play they 
are in is endless and all there is.”’O Thus the metaphor of farce reminds us 
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of the real circumstance it distorts. When we agree to watch, we have 
sealed the bargain with the sacrificial victim. When we laugh, the sacrifice 
has been accepted. This may be why the experience of watching movie 
cartoons - which are basic Punch and Judy, ritual beating farce in the 
ancient Roman mode - is so important to children. Cartoons help sup- 
port us through that horrifying first apprehension that we are vulnerable 
and mortal, making it easier to live with fear, to believe that justice is pos- 
sible, to laugh hard, and to face the mysteries and the terrors of growing 
up and growing older. 
III. The Ritual Dance of Oj$m and SamFce 
In David Mamet’s Oleanna, we can see tragedy and comedy doing 
this same intimate, mirrored dance of offer and sacrifice.” What is at 
stake is nothing less than our apprehension of right and justice. Mamet‘s 
play is particularly interesting in this context because it begins as a relent- 
lessly domestic problem. There is a dispute between a teacher and a 
student, and an effort is made to heal it. But the teacher, John, is often 
c.ondescending and obtuse. For a teacher he is a remarkably poor listener 
-- arrogant and self-absorbed. The student, Carol, is confined by a kind 
of learning disability (or arrested developmental stage) that allows her to 
understand only formulaic, true-or-false answers to questions and explic- 
it instructions about what to do next. The result is that when she asks her 
very literal questions, John’s misplaced attempts to reason with her turn 
from dialogues to lectures, ever more one-sided, more convoluted, and 
more impossible to understand. She becomes more confused and desper- 
ate since she understands nothing of his meandering, asides, footnotes, 
a Ilusions, illucidations, and explanations. He launches into one line after 
another of critical exposition, term definition, issue discussion, and even 
anecdote about his own life, past and present, hoping these personal ges- 
tures will reduce the tension and will help his student learn. He vainly 
believes, in the name of patient pedagogy and reason, that this will pro- 
duce mutual understanding and solve the problem. But he is listening 
only to himself. 
As we watch, we are probably frustrated by their inability to get 
together, by their stubbornness and the rather sad incapacities which dig 
them ever deeper into a morass of conflict. This is a good setting for a 
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comic turn - a revelation that helps each of them to see the other, to 
relax and laugh a bit, to recognize their limitations and foibles, and to 
start learning from the other. The comic transformation would be toward 
a student rewarded for her persistence and determination, and a professor 
satisfied that he has found a way to overcome obstacles and teach suc- 
cessfully. Each would find tolerance for the other’s eccentricities, and the 
happy couple would then achieve their comic union, not in sex in this 
case, but in the good feeling and the anticipation of future fruitfulness 
that crowns any successful relationship. Justice would be done for both of 
them in its most merciful form. 
As we know, of course, things turn out very differently. Carol’s dis- 
connected, factoidal memory of the transactions of the first act is 
apparently laid out for her by her “group” into a picture of a different 
kind. Each of John’s utterances will be decontextualized and reassembled, 
then hurled back at him as accusations. Harassment and assault appear as 
the perfect postmodern deconstruction: unpredictable, dangerous, in 
arbitrary context, and the result of conflicting social ideologies and forces. 
As Carol, now empowered, now in the driver’s seat, presses her charges, 
one after the other, John makes an effort to explain to her, to admit his 
condescensions and other minor failings, to philosophically sympathize 
with her position about what she is supposed to be learning. He only 
gradually sees that she is instituting not one, but a whole series of prose- 
cutions against him, first to the full extent of university regulations, then 
to the full extent of the law. As John’s situation, both in the university and 
beyond, grows more desperate, he becomes more and more like the 
demon she believes she is prosecuting. Finally, in the end, accused of rape, 
he knocks her down, stopping just short of smashing her with a chair, 
screaming that he wouldn’t touch her sexually with a ten foot pole. He has 
almost become the monster she already sees him as being. 
What has happened in this play? The action of the play, as in John 
Millington Synge’s Riders to the Sea, feels like a tidal wave coming to 
destroy a person, a family. We see it coming. It comes on relentlessly. It 
arrives and crashes down. It destroys. It is over. The storms in the sea off 
the Aran Isles - random events of nature - impersonally kill off one 
fisherman after another, leaving their families devastated and destitute. In 
feeling, this resembles the natural storm which catches Lear naked on the 
heath and the human one which later kills Cordelia. This latter is the 
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“Great thing of us forgot!” by Albany, who, if he had remembered earlier 
that Edmund’s forces had captured Lear and Cordelia, might have saved 
her. But in tragedy the winds will blow until they are exhausted, and some 
of us will have to pick up the pieces when it is over and begin again. Inside 
the comic mirror of Okanna, an amusing vision of two absurdly limited 
and flawed people, a tragic wind blows. Like Gloucester‘s blinding in the 
wake of his misapprehension of the characters of his own sons, injury 
comes suddenly and with striking cruelty. What‘s left is really painful and 
hard to bear. 
It seems to me, then, that Oleanna is not about whether it is Carol or 
John who is right or wrong. It is about the horror of what viciousness, stu- 
pidity, and blindness wreak when we mistake them for justice, wisdom, 
and vision. Carol does destroy John’s career, and probably his family life. 
But his deafness and arrogance, his pompous self-obsession and obtuse- 
ness as a teacher are also damaging. The deepest irony in the vision the 
play presents is that the context is typically comic. These are manners, 
styles, and social institutions which are being examined. They signal the 
domestic comedy of manners to the audience in an instant. They carry 
with them a sense that though fashions may change and conflicts arise, we 
can correct our worst faults, change, and solve the crisis created by our 
own foolishness. Here we have two narrow creatures whose knee-jerk 
reactions and drastic limitations, given their chosen roles in life, are quite 
ridiculous. John is almost a clown, a pretentious pedant-expert, much like 
Oliver Hardy. Carol is the waif, the nincompoop, the blunderer, all con- 
centration and concern - not dissimilar to Stan Laurel. Like all good 
comic characters, they take themselves seriously. But what is at stake is 
not, for instance, pride in the face of a petty insult, as in Laurel and 
Hardy, but something larger: learning, the truth, the obligation of the 
teacher, the striving of the learner to understand a difficult and frighten- 
ing world. Try as we might, we are not quite permitted to laugh. The form 
of the comic world is there, but it has taken a sour turn. While Laurel and 
Hardy can destroy a whole car or house without significant consequences, 
here the consequences, in the second act, come thick and fast. 
Perhaps one reason why the play has provoked so much controversy 
and outrage is not just that it seems to some critics to be a rigged case, but 
that Mamet will not let us have our comedy, will not let us see these peo- 
ple as clowns whose actions may teach us a little something but, after all, 
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do not mean much. Mamet has offered the sacrifice, but it is not accept- 
able. He has shown us a domestic world which - as if we did not know 
it - is unsafe and unjust. 
Something profound, after all, has been lost - not only some faith 
in what it might mean to be student and teacher, to be learner and schol- 
ar, but faith in the comic rite, in the coming together of the loose and 
ragged ends of imperfect individual transactions into the justice of 
Walzer’s “thick relationships,” the working, acceptable weave of the 
social fabric. But I predict that as the social fashions change, and the 
pressure of the issues raised is eased, this play will seem dryer and fun- 
nier. Age will make its characters more and more ridiculous, and the play 
will be more fun. 
IT? Joining the Dance 
As we look down at comic characters and ridicule them from a dis- 
tance, laughing at them for what they have to learn (we are much wiser 
than they are!), part of us cannot forget that they are our sacrifices to the 
household gods, to the gods of survival and security.lZ In the Dionysian 
mood, without the death of tragic characters, we could not live. And 
without the humiliations comic characters endure, we could not be 
assured and confident of our competence and acceptability. The first 
corollary of the thesis advanced earlier, that farce is itself a sacrifice to 
tragedy, is that we make the sacrifice so that comedy can live. 
When they are successful, our comedians on the stand-up stage are 
said to “knock ‘em dead.” In the tradition of stand-up, the “them” is us, 
in the audience, laughing at ourselves, at our humorlessness and overseri- 
ousness, at our pretensions, violent customs, and deadly ignorance. Thus 
the stage-edge has nearly disappeared, or works, by mutual agreement, in 
both directions at once. On the stand-up stage, the threat of comic dis- 
grace disappears when its exemplar, the comedian, takes his bow and 
exits. On the comic stage, however, the threat is on-going. We need the 
protection of the comic god to be sure that matters domestic stay that 
way. The sudden onslaught of disease, war, natural disaster; the depreda- 
tions of power-seekers; the corruption of justice; the hypocritical, murky 
swamps of political maneuverings; the welling horror of fear, anger, and 
violence felt by one individual or one group toward another - all these 
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can rip apart our domestic tranquility not only with a brutal suddenness, 
but with an equally brutal arbitrariness. If the good King Lear is right 
about the indifference of the gods, only comedy can save us - and only 
then for a while. The sacrifice must be continual, and it must be effective. 
We must find a way to laugh, for the comic laugh is the expiration of the 
breath that builds societies. Without that, we spend our time in caves, 
shrinking in fear. 
In the hands of Samuel Beckett or Harold Pinter, or the early Tom 
Stoppard of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead or Enter a Free Man, 
or the David Mamet of Oleanna, we find the everyday domestic world of 
comedy, but without its customary wall of protection, its castle-keep sep- 
arating it from the ultimate truths and ironies, chaos and destruction of 
tragedy. Here in the world of tragi-comedy the walls leak, and seeping 
into the very warp and woof of that social fabric which is supposed to pro- 
i-ect us - into the minor details of everyday reality, which, if they go 
wrong, we should be able to fix like the plumbing - are the seeds of dis- 
~ster, of humiliation, destruction, and chaos. This is particularly clear in 
plays like Oleanna, The Widow? Blind Date by Israel Horowitz, The Visit 
by Friedrich Diirrenmatt, Joe Egg by Peter Nichols, or Angeh in America 
l,y Tony Kushner. 
As the butts of the comedy we take the boot-heel of tragedy in the 
iieck, as Bertolt Brecht might have stated it. As Pogo said, with an apolo- 
getic little grin, “We have met the enemy and he is us.” If Pogo, the 
cmbodiment of gentle social optimism, Walt Kelly’s animal sacrifice to 
the gods of civility in politics (a possum in a world of raccoons), sees the 
irony, maybe we can see it. As Al Capp’s Li’l Abner put it, “Any fool can 
see thet ... Ah see it!” 
If we are doomed as a species, it may be because we have built self- 
collapsing gods of this kind, and we will continue to chase them round 
and round, up the tails of our own pretensions. If we are not doomed, it 
may be that in laughter we will find the courage to rebuild that stage- 
edge. By taking advantage of the inherently metaphorical structure of 
drama, by carrying a new set of meanings from the individual to the soci- 
ety, from the gods to humankind, and back again, we can restoke the 
metaphor of the drama from the thickly ironical world of justice. In turn, 
w e  can reinvigorate our structures of justice from our largest sense of the 
meaning of human action in our expectations of dramatic action. In rec- 
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ognizing the tragedy and reconstructing the farce, we can reinform a com- 
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Id.., at 87. The same might be said for action, plot, and theme (what Artistotle called 
“thought”), since each, in the poststructuralist mode, is deconstructed to the fragments 
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asked whether Mamet has ruined the play by using the first act to tell us what he thinks 
is “the truth” about who John and Carol are and what happened between them, loading 
the case for John and against Carol. This assumes, of course, that what is at stake in the 
play is summed up in the question of what sexual harassment is, whether it really hap- 
pened in this case, and by extension, whether it happens at all. Could the play be as much 
about the failure of certain ideas about teaching and knowledge, about study and learn- 
ing, as it is about sexual harassment and the anti-intellectual depredations of political 
correctness? Could it be about a connection between the two sets of ideas, each illumi- 
nating the other? In the deconstructionist, post-structural critical stance, these questions 
cannot be framed, let alone answered. Could it be about what happens when two people 
trap themselves in conflicting, stereotypical roles which flow from the institutions and 
the social structures in which they live? One codd argue that such a description is use- 
ful for understanding hundreds of plays across centuries and cultures. Richardson argues 
that we need the capacities of poststructuralist analysis, but that it should be combined 
with elements of humanist and formalist criticism to derive a cogent analysis of the shift- 
ing, and sometimes contradictory, representations of character in contemporary drama. 
In pursuing this analysis, I have used largely the humanist and the formalist modes, pre- 
ferring those traditions which see works of art as real entities, and forms as wholes, with 
power to make meaning out of their parts. 
See Mark Pizzato, “Theaters of Sacrifice: Greek, Aztec, and Postmodern,” in Bettina E. 
Schmidt and Mark Miinzel, eds., Ethnologie und Inszenierung: Ansatze zur 
Theuterethnofugie (Marburg: Forderverein Volkerkunde, 1998), pp. 137- 167. 
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